A Powerful Response

‍American Legion Magazine, July 2015

President Lyndon Johnson called it “another Cuba.” Ambassador William Tapley Bennett called it “collective madness.”[1] One historian described it as the bloodiest battle in Dominican history.[2] It all led to what the U.S. military called “Operation Power Pack”: a rapid-response mission that stabilized the Dominican Republic (DR), protected U.S. interests and prevented another nation from sliding into communism.

Takeover

Promising political, constitutional and economic reforms, Juan Bosch was elected DR president in December 1962, but was overthrown by the Dominican military in September 1963.

Washington recognized the post-Bosch government. Then, in spring 1965, Colonel Francisco Caamaño led elements of the DR military in toppling the post-Bosch government and installing a new regime under the “Constitutionalist” banner. The rest of the DR army—the “Loyalists”—used heavy weapons to fight the rebels. ‍‍ ‍

The crisis rapidly devolved into a civil war. At least 3,000 Dominicans were killed in the fighting.[3]‍ ‍

Washington worried that the Caamaño insurgency “had been coopted by Castro,” Mark Updegrove writes in his history of the Johnson presidency, Indomitable Will.[4] U.S. Embassy cables estimated 1,500 rebels were under communist command.[5]‍ ‍

By late April 1965, Johnson privately warned lawmakers that “Castro forces are…gaining control” and worried that “another Cuba” was taking root.[6] Publicly, he added: “People trained outside the Dominican Republic are seeking to gain control.”[7]‍ ‍

When the prospect of military intervention was raised, Updegrove details, a U.S. diplomat said American troops “shooting up a capital city” was “the last thing we want to happen.” Underscoring his seriousness, Johnson bluntly replied, “No…The last thing we want to have happen is a communist takeover.”[8]‍ ‍

Trapped
USS Boxer had steamed to the region. Bennett wanted the flattop “to move within sight of land in order to demonstrate the U.S. presence,” as Lawrence Yates, a scholar with the Combat Studies Institute, wrote in his definitive account of Operation Power Pack.[9] Much of what we know about this oft-overlooked operation is thanks to Yates; this article relies on his recap of Power Pack’s inner workings.‍‍ ‍

On April 26, as rebels menaced Americans at the Hotel Embajador in Santo Domingo and Loyalist troops began moving on the capital city, the Pentagon placed units of the 82nd Airborne on alert.‍ ‍

On April 28, Johnson reported, “American lives are in danger,” and noted that 400 Marines had landed to evacuate Americans.[10] This vanguard Marine force arrived by helicopter from the Boxer, landing west of Santo Domingo.[11]‍ ‍

It wasn’t the first time the United States intervened in DR: American forces intervened in 1798, 1903, 1904, 1914 and 1916-1924.[12]‍ ‍

Fast-forward to 1965. As the situation deteriorated in the capital, 1,500 more Marines from 6th MEU arrived, coming ashore southwest of Santo Domingo.[13]‍ ‍

Advance elements of the 82nd were to parachute into an area near San Isidro, east of Santo Domingo; secure an airfield; move west to the Duarte Bridge; and assist in evacuating Americans. But rather than conduct an airborne assault, the decision was made to land the troop-loaded planes. It was a fortunate audible. The LZ was “covered with coral,” Yates noted. “Had the original plan calling for an airdrop been carried out, the casualty rate…would have been enormously high.”[14]‍ ‍

A fleet of 144 C-130s delivered the spearhead force April 30.[15] Robert Yago, crew chief on a C-130 from the 41st Troop Carrier Squadron, shuttled troops and equipment from Ft. Bragg in North Carolina to Ramey AFB in Puerto Rico to San Isidro. “It’s much easier to kick ‘em out the back door,” he admits, than landing in not-so-friendly territory.[16]‍ ‍

John Kiser of the 82nd Airborne’s 1/504 (A Company) remembers touching down in the predawn darkness. “The planes never even stopped,” he recalls. “They landed and taxied, and we drove out on jeeps and ran out the back.”[17]‍ ‍

Once on the ground, the 82nd’s troopers crossed to the west side of the bridge, coming under heavy fire from Constitutionalist units. The Americans used 105-mm howitzers to silence the enemy guns, though stricter rules of engagement soon limited the use of heavy weapons.[18] Kiser notes that Washington “did some things that were really stupid” regarding ROEs. At one point, “They told us we weren’t allowed to shoot unless shot at.”[19]‍ ‍

The Marines focused on securing areas between the U.S. Embassy and the Hotel Embajador. Using tanks and light-tracked vehicles as cover, they crept along streets named after George Washington and Abraham Lincoln. As the Marines cleared out snipers, they sustained their first KIA.[20]‍ ‍

The situation in Santo Domingo was precarious. “Troops—not land—provided the only buffer between U.S. officials and the rebels,” Yates wrote.[21]‍ ‍

U.S. ground commanders soon decided to establish a corridor linking the Marine position in Santo Domingo with the Army position east of the city. A company of Marines moved northeast, encountering no resistance as they arrived at the rendezvous point. But their counterparts from the 82nd met stiff resistance, suffering their first KIA; another trooper died from wounds sustained in the maneuver.[22]‍ ‍

The corridor—or “line of communication” (LOC)—allowed for secure communication and transportation, enabled the delivery of humanitarian aid (U.S. forces delivered 15,000 tons of food[23]), and trapped 80 percent of the rebel force. By May 3, the LOC “ended any possibility that the Constitutionalists could take over the country by military means,” according to Yates. “They were surrounded and outgunned.”[24]‍ ‍

Cold and Hot
Johnson dispatched John Martin, a former ambassador to DR, to liaise with the rebels.[25] If Martin could broker a deal, Johnson wanted to have enough troops to make it stick, so he ordered the rest of the 82nd Airborne and the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade to DR. He also placed the 101st Airborne on alert.[26]‍ ‍

By mid-May, the U.S. had 24,000 troops in DR, including the 5th Logistics Command, 15th Field Hospital, 503rd Military Police Battalion, 50th Signal Battalion, 218th Military Intelligence Detachment, 519th MI Battalion, 1st Psychological Warfare Battalion, 42nd Civil Affairs Company and 7th Special Forces Group. In addition, the Air Force moved fighter and reconnaissance elements to Ramey. All told, some 40,000 U.S. troops supported the operation.[27]‍ ‍

Martin convinced the warring factions to sign something resembling a ceasefire, and both sides agreed to ask the Organization of American States (OAS) for assistance ending the conflict. An OAS-backed peacekeeping force included U.S., Brazilian, Honduran, Paraguayan, Nicaraguan, Costa Rican and Salvadoran troops.[28]‍ ‍

As things cooled down, each warring faction declared its own president. And then things began to heat up.‍‍ ‍

Kiser recalls two rebel P-51 Mustangs trying to break the blockade that divided the rebel force by strafing U.S. positions. “We all dove for cover as they flew over us,” he explains. “Battalion sent up more jeeps with 50-calibers and M60 machine guns to assist us. When the planes came in again, they dove and opened up on us, we all fired back. The first plane broke out in smoke and crashed into the mountains behind us. The second plane was smoking too, but managed to turn back out to the bay, where the pilot bailed out.”[29]‍ ‍

With rebel forces attacking, and food riots bubbling up north of the LOC, U.S. officials on the ground decided to respond militarily. But the White House was worried about escalation. So, Johnson dispatched yet another team of negotiators to press a diplomatic solution.

That didn’t stop Loyalist troops from taking action north of the LOC. Loyalist operations weakened the rebels, but when Loyalist forces tried to use aircraft to deliver perhaps a knockout blow, Washington ordered U.S. troops to block them from doing so.[30]‍ ‍‍ ‍

In mid-June, rebel forces attacked a U.S.-Brazilian position with mortars and rockets. The 82nd answered with everything it could, triggering America’s bloodiest battle in Operation Power Pack—31 U.S. casualties, including three killed.[31] U.S. troops were poised to crush the enemy, but again Washington intervened.[32]‍ ‍

By August, both sides agreed to an “Act of Reconciliation” paving the way for a provisional government. In the months that followed, U.S. and OAS forces disarmed various factions, rounded up leaders from both sides for exile and turned back yet another attempted coup.[33]‍ ‍

The last U.S. units left DR in September 1966. Forty-seven Americans were killed and 172 wounded during the operation.[34]‍ ‍

Previews‍ ‍

Power Pack achieved the president’s objectives—protecting American citizens, stabilizing DR, preventing a communist takeover—arguably in spite of the president’s decisions. Johnson’s micromanagement in DR foreshadowed his handling of Vietnam.‍‍ ‍

U.S. forces displayed a remarkable mix of restraint, flexibility and skill—switching back and forth from combat to peacekeeping, delivering food one day and hunting snipers the next, completing the mission despite straightjacket ROEs, and helping DR through a nightmare. As Yates discovered, a common scrawl of graffiti around Santo Domingo during Power Pack read: “Yankee go home—and take me with you.”[35]‍ ‍

‍ ‍

[1]Colonel Brendan J. O'Shea, http://www.army.mil/mobile/article/?p=37660 and Lawrence A. Yates, Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic 1965-1966, Combat Studies Institute, 1988 http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a211926.pdf, p.37 and p.44.

[2] Yates p.43.

[3] Patrick Brogan, World Conflicts, 1998, p.645.

[4] Mark Updegrove, Indomitable Will, 2012, p.194

[5] Yates, p.67.

[6] Updegrove, p.195.

[7] Updegrove, p.195.

[8] Updegrove, p.196.

[9] Yates, p.44.

[10] http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26922&st=dominican&st1

[11] Colonel Brendan J. O'Shea, http://www.army.mil/mobile/article/?p=37660 

[12] Barbara Salazar Torreon, Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2013, CRS Report to Congress, August 30, 2013; Gary Prado Chandler and Liza Prado Chandler, Dominican Republic, 1999, pp.28-32.

[13] Yates, pp67-68.

[14] Yates, pp.62 and 69

[15] Yates, p.68.

[16] Phone interview, April 28, 2015.

[17] Phone interview, April 30, 2015.

[18] Yates, pp.84-85.

[19] Phone Interview, April 30, 2015.

[20] Yates, p.74 and pp.82-84.

[21] Yates, p.85

[22] Yates, p.88

[23] Yates, p.134

[24] Yates, pp.94-96.

[25] Yates, p.77.

[26] Yates 77-78

[27] O’Shea.

[28] Yates, pp.147-149.

[29] Correspondence dated April 29, 2015.

[30] Yates, p 116.

[31] Yates,pp.158-159.

[32] Yates, pp.158-161.

[33] Yates, pp.165-169.

[34] Yates, p.122 and p.176.

[35] Yates, p.140.

‍ ‍