This Century’s West Berlin
American Legion, 6.1.22
Vladimir Putin’s brutal invasion of Ukraine and all the consequences flowing from it have given us a glimpse of what lies ahead if Xi Jinping keeps his word and tries to absorb Taiwan. Deterring him from taking that step must be viewed as a vital national-security interest of the United States.
Views
Xi’s words and actions—not unlike Putin’s in his buildup to war—suggest he is ready to move against Taiwan.
Consider Beijing’s published military strategy, which describes “the Taiwan issue” as key to “China’s reunification and long-term development.”[1] Xi declares, “Complete reunification of the motherland…will definitely be fulfilled.” He ominously adds, “We make no promise to abandon the use of force and retain the option of taking all necessary measures” against Taiwan.[2]
These words are deeply problematic. Taiwan has never been ruled by the PRC, so “reunification” is inaccurate. Beijing is misusing the word in an effort to legitimize plans to annex Taiwan and delegitimize Taiwan’s sovereignty.
Moreover, 85 percent of Taiwan’s population oppose Beijing’s idea of unification, 67 percent identify as “Taiwanese,” just 2.4 percent identify as “Chinese.” Not surprisingly, Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen, calls the island democracy “a sovereign independent country.”[3]
This chasm between how Beijing views Taiwan and how Taiwan views itself is leading to a perilous test of wills.
Actions
If Beijing’s words are problematic, its actions are downright warlike.
On a single day this year, Beijing deployed 39 fighter and bomber aircraft into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ).[4] Last year, Taiwan weathered 969 of these PRC incursions—up from 380 in 2020.[5] A four-day stretch last year saw Beijing hurl 149 warplanes into Taiwan’s ADIZ[6]—prompting Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin to conclude, “It looks like a rehearsal.”[7] Also in 2021, Beijing conducted simultaneous wargames off Taiwan’s east and west coasts.[8]
In 2020, while the world tried to cope with a made-in-China pandemic, Beijing conducted provocative naval exercises around Taiwan; violated the median line separating PRC-ROC airspace;[9] practiced large-scale amphibious assaults;[10]; and then—in violation of international treaties and in an unmistakable signal to Taiwan—absorbed Hong Kong.[11]
In 2018-19, Beijing employed misinformation and manipulation of social media to interfere in Taiwan’s elections.[12] In 2015-16, a PRC aircraft carrier circled the island, and satellites snapped images of PRC training grounds featuring mockups of key infrastructure in Taiwan—the presidential complex, Taichung Airport and foreign ministry.[13]
Targets
The Pentagon concludes Beijing is “preparing for potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait.”[14] If such a conflict comes, it won’t be a fair fight.
According to the Pentagon, PRC assets based near Taiwan include: 416,000 troops, six amphibious ships, 700 fighter aircraft, 250 bombers/attack aircraft and 253 warships. The PRC also has two aircraft carriers and more than 1,600 missiles opposite Taiwan.[15]
Taiwan has 88,000 troops total; 109 navy and coastguard vessels total; 400 fighter aircraft total; zero amphibious ships; and zero bombers.
Beijing’s military buildup around Taiwan is just a microcosm of its wider military expansion. Beijing has built the world’s largest navy; massively expanded its nuclear arsenal and nuclear-missile beds; exploded military spending by 514 percent[16] (since 2000); claimed a vast swath of the South China Sea; and erected illegal, militarized islands to back up those claims.[17]
A PRC attack on Taiwan would directly affect America’s third- and eighth-largest trading partners, disrupt one-third of global shipping, and put at risk more than half of the world’s semiconductor production.[18]
Moreover, a takeover of Taiwan would give Xi reason to believe he can move against other targets. In addition to Taiwan, Beijing has territorial disputes with 16 nations—including U.S. treaty allies Japan, the Philippines and South Korea.[19] If America failed to come to Taiwan’s defense, those allies would doubt America’s security commitment, and Beijing would exploit those doubts to great effect.
Defenses
If, as Henry Kissinger concludes, America and China are in “the foothills of a cold war,” then Taiwan is arguably this century’s West Berlin: a tiny island of freedom under constant, immediate threat from a communist behemoth.
Now, as during Cold War I, it’s imperative that the Free World defend this patch of free government. Now, as during Cold War I, showing readiness to repel an attack will help deter an attack. However, deterrence only works if the enemy believes the costs of aggression to be greater than any potential benefits of aggression.
The bad news is that Taiwan and the U.S. haven’t done enough in recent years to deter Beijing.
Compare Taiwan’s defense spending as a share of GDP (1.9 percent) with that of countries under similar threat: Israel invests 5.6 percent of GDP on defense, India 2.9 percent, South Korea 2.8 percent.[20]
Taiwan is working to correct its deterrence gaps. In 2019, Taiwan announced its biggest defense-spending increase in a decade. Taiwan’s defense spending is now at its highest level since the 1990s.[21] Taipei plans to allocate 2.3 percent of GDP to defense.[22]
How Taipei invests in defense is as important as how much it invests. What’s been termed “a porcupine defense”—one that would make an invasion so painful as to dissuade Beijing from even attempting it—would focus on antiship missiles, “smart” mines capable of remote activation/deactivation, inexpensive UCAVs and drones capable of swarm attacks, shoulder-launched antiaircraft missiles, VSTOL fighter-bombers capable of operating without runways, nondigital communications operable despite cyberattacks, a citizenry trained and equipped for small-unit operations.[23] These are the kinds of countermeasures that have bled Putin’s army.
Indeed, Xi must be made to understand that attempting in Taiwan what Putin has done in Ukraine will lead not to victory parades and an ascendant legacy, but to his troops in body bags, his military hardware in flames, his invasion force and international standing in tatters.
Toward that end, the U.S. should expedite and expand delivery of such countermeasures. Those defenses need to start flowing now. Unlike Ukraine, which shares land borders with four NATO allies—representing numerous overland delivery corridors allowing for resupply—Taiwan is hundreds of miles from the nearest U.S. base. And America’s Indo-Pacific allies may not be as eager as their European counterparts to join a resupply operation, especially once PRC missiles start flying. Indeed, Beijing has trained its vast antiship-missile arsenal on the maritime approaches to Taiwan.
A timeless insight from President Franklin Roosevelt serves as a sharp counterpoint to objections from Xi and his apologists: “Such aid is not an act of war, even if a dictator should unilaterally proclaim it so to be.” Deterring aggression doesn’t constitute aggression.
Ships
America also needs to invest more in its own deterrent strength. America’s deterrent was credible for much of Cold War I—but not the early phases, when Moscow blockaded West Berlin and greenlighted the invasion of South Korea. America may be facing a similar deterrent deficit today vis-à-vis Beijing.
Recently, near the end of his tenure commanding U.S. Army-Pacific, Gen. Robert Brown noticed that his PRC counterparts “don’t fear us anymore.”[24] That’s regrettable but understandable. As America’s defense budget limps away from sequestration and strains to stay ahead of inflation, the calculus is rapidly shifting in Beijing.[25]
The U.S. defense budget is 3.2 percent of GDP.[26] The average during Cold War I was twice that. Thus, at the height of President Ronald Reagan’s rebuild, the Navy boasted 594 ships.[27] The Navy deploys just 296 ships today[28]—and those ships are dispersed around the world, while China’s 355 warships are concentrated in its neighborhood.[29]
Today’s Navy may be more ambidextrous than yesterday’s, but deterrence is about presence. America’s Navy lacks the ships to be present all the places it’s needed. According to CNO Adm. Mike Gilday, “We need a Naval force of over 500 ships.”[30]
Commitments
To keep Beijing at bay, we also need a clear commitment to Taiwan’s security. From Kiev to Kabul, Washington’s commitment to non-treaty partners has been anything but clear in recent years.
Under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), neither side of the Taiwan Strait knows exactly what Washington would do in the event of war. The TRA pledges America will provide Taiwan “capacity…to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion.” There’s nothing in the TRA’s lawyerly words that guarantees Taiwan’s security or obliges the U.S. to come to Taiwan’s defense. This policy of “strategic ambiguity” may have served a purpose in the past, but it’s a recipe for disaster today.
There’s a reason Washington crafted mutual-defense treaties during Cold War I with clear statements of U.S. commitment, a reason U.S. troops stayed in West Berlin, a reason U.S. forces have been on the 38th Parallel since 1953 and are now forward-deployed in the Baltics and Poland: These factors remove any doubt about the consequences. That certainty of response—the promise that the costs of aggression will be greater than the benefits—is the essence of deterrence. And it works. The ambiguity that characterizes the TRA, on the other hand, is leading to miscalculation, which often leads to war.
Signals
The good news is that key allies are signaling it’s time for clarity in Taiwan.
Nobuo Kishi, Japan’s defense minister, declares, “The peace and stability of Taiwan are directly connected to Japan.”[31] Peter Dutton, Australia’s defense minister, says it would be “inconceivable that we wouldn’t support the U.S.” in defending Taiwan.[32]
Poland, Lithuania, Slovakia and the Czech Republic have spoken up for Taiwan.[33] The most powerful of these was Milos Vystrcil, president of the Czech senate, who traveled to Taipei to address Taiwan’s legislature. Echoing President John Kennedy’s “I am a Berliner” speech, Vystrcil declared, in Mandarin: “I’m a Taiwanese.”[34]
Washington, too, is sending signals. In 2015, after a PRC bomber menaced Taiwan, the Obama administration landed two F-18s on the island (the first such landing since 1985), citing what the Pentagon called a “warning light” issue. In truth, Washington was reminding Beijing that Taiwan isn’t alone.[35] The Obama administration also approved $14 billion in weapons sales to Taiwan.[36]
President Donald Trump broke the taboo of communicating directly with Taiwan’s leader by phone[37], increased freedom-of-navigation operations through the Taiwan Strait, authorized $15 billion in arms sales[38], and dispatched a cabinet official to Taiwan (the highest-level U.S. government visit since 1979). U.S. Navy vessels docked in Taiwan in 2018[39] and 2019.[40] In addition, the Trump administration quietly deployed U.S. troops to the island to train Taiwanese personnel.[41]
The Biden administration let it be known that U.S. troops were on the island.[42] Calling Taiwan “a critical economic and security partner,”[43] President Joe Biden invited Taiwan’s top diplomat to his inauguration.[44] And when asked if “the United States would come to Taiwan's defense,” Biden bluntly responded, “Yes.”[45]
The Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act would codify those words. If passed into law, it would authorize the use of force “to secure and protect Taiwan against…direct armed attack.”[46]
Islands
There’s risk in all this. But World War I reminds us that there’s greater risk in leaving defense guarantees opaque. World War II and Cold War I remind us that making the necessary investments to deter war is far less costly than waging war. And Russia’s rampage through Ukraine reminds us that helping free nations harden their territory against invasion is preferable to scrambling to help them try to claw it back.
Yes, Taiwan is relatively remote; it’s in the crosshairs of a military juggernaut; that juggernaut has conventional advantages in-theater. But each of these factors applied in West Berlin, which Kennedy called “a defended island of freedom.” It remained free only because it was defended.
[1] https://news.usni.org/2015/05/26/document-chinas-military-strategy
[2]https://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-changing-status-quo-taiwan-strait-41062https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/gordon-chang-why-chinese-invasion-taiwan-would-be-massive-mistake-170595https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-58854081
[3]https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3038456/beijing-interferes-daily-taiwans-election-says-tsai-ing-wenhttps://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/more-than-80-percent-of-taiwanese-01092019115150.htmlhttps://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2020/07/05/2003739375
[4] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/24/china-sends-largest-incursion-of-warplanes-into-taiwan-defence-zone-since-october
[5] https://amp.dw.com/en/wary-of-china-taiwan-calls-for-vigilance-amid-ukraine-escalation/a-60882104
[6]https://graphics.reuters.com/TAIWAN-CHINA/byvrjrmgnve/https://breakingdefense.com/2021/10/149-chinese-fighters-bombers-sweep-across-taiwan-adiz-in-4-days/
[7] https://www.foxnews.com/politics/lloyd-austin-says-increased-china-activity-near-taiwan-looks-like-rehearsal
[8]https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/07/asia/china-taiwan-military-surrounded-intl-hnk-scli-ml/index.html?mc_cid=2b5b6f2bf0&mc_eid=0a51c5fb81
[9] https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific_taiwan-says-chinese-warplanes-are-crossing-median-line-there-median-line/6197594.html
[10] https://news.usni.org/2021/11/07/china-builds-missile-targets-shaped-like-u-s-aircraft-carrier-destroyers-in-remote-desert
[11]https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-china-security-analysis/polishing-the-gun-china-u-s-tensions-raise-taiwan-conflict-fears-idUSKBN25M0VEhttps://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-protests-britain/uk-says-chinas-security-law-is-serious-violation-of-hong-kong-treaty-idUSKBN2425LL
[12]https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/30/taiwan-presidential-election-referendum-on-ties-with-chinahttps://www.cfr.org/in-brief/how-china-interfering-taiwans-electionhttps://foreignpolicy.com/2019/06/26/chinese-cyber-operatives-boosted-taiwans-insurgent-candidate/
[13]https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/taiwan-says-china-is-flexing-its-muscles-with-bomber-flighthttps://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-defence-taiwan-idUSKBN14G053?utm_source=RealClearDefense+Morning+Recon&utm_campaign=e0f83f1db5-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2016_12_27&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_694f73a8dc-e0f83f1db5-81835633https://thediplomat.com/2015/08/satellite-imagery-from-china-suggests-mock-invasion-of-taiwan/
[14] Defense Department, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2021
[15]https://jamestown.org/program/taiwans-han-kuang-exercises-training-for-a-chinese-invasion-one-drill-at-a-time/https://jamestown.org/program/taiwans-han-kuang-exercises-training-for-a-chinese-invasion-one-drill-at-a-time/
[16]https://chinapower.csis.org/military-spending/https://news.usni.org/2021/10/26/mystery-shrouds-chinese-defense-spending
[17]https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDFhttps://apnews.com/article/technology-europe-business-science-china-79388639f73d8c8835001982bcb016d6
[18]https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/toppartners.htmlhttps://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/https://focustaiwan.tw/business/202109040011https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/16/2-charts-show-how-much-the-world-depends-on-taiwan-for-semiconductors.html
[19]https://www.theweek.co.uk/news/world-news/china/955728/all-countries-china-territory-disputes
[20]https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-04/fs_2104_milex_0.pdf
[21] Defense Department, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2021
[22] https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/taiwan-proposes-defence-budget-increase-for-2022
[23] https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2779.html
[24] https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/a-little-bit-of-fear-is-a-strong-deterrent/
[25]https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/a-little-bit-of-fear-is-a-strong-deterrent/https://breakingdefense.com/2021/04/bidens-defense-budget-flat-state-domestic-programs-big-winners/
[26]https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2021/12/27/biden-signs-740b-defense-policy-bill-to-overhaul-sexual-assault-prosecutions-review-afghan-war/https://www.bea.gov/news/2022/gross-domestic-product-fourth-quarter-and-year-2021-advance-estimate
[27] https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/us-ship-force-levels.html#1979
[28] https://news.usni.org/2022/02/07/usni-news-fleet-and-marine-tracker-feb-7-2022#more-91876
[29] https://news.usni.org/2021/11/03/china-has-worlds-largest-navy-with-355-ships-and-counting-says-pentagon
[30] https://news.usni.org/2022/02/18/cno-gilday-we-need-a-naval-force-of-over-500-ships
[31] https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/japans-revolution-on-taiwan-affairs/
[32] https://breakingdefense.com/2021/11/aussies-would-join-us-to-defend-taiwan-defense-minister-says-inconceivable-they-wouldnt/
[33] https://www.wsj.com/articles/taiwan-gains-favor-in-europes-east-angering-china-11635248811
[34]https://apnews.com/article/international-news-asia-pacific-europe-6837b18b98f887619400da919c0a22e3
[35]https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2015/04/02/china-objects-after-2-us-f-18s-land-in-taiwan/https://www.stripes.com/marine-corps-jets-forced-to-land-on-taiwan-1.338066
[36] https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2021/01/09/2003750238
[37] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38191711
[38] https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2021/01/09/2003750238
[39] https://www.yahoo.com/entertainment/us-navy-research-vessel-docks-taiwan-amid-china-060351270.html
[40] https://asiatimes.com/2019/09/after-f-16-sale-us-navy-ship-stops-in-taiwan/
[41] https://time.com/4589641/donald-trump-china-taiwan-call/ https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/08/secretary-azars-taiwan-visit-should-be-celebrated-for.html
[42]https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-troops-have-been-deployed-in-taiwan-for-at-least-a-year-11633614043?mod=hp_lead_pos6
[43] https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf
[44] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biden-taiwan/taiwan-biden-ties-off-to-strong-start-with-invite-for-top-diplomat-idUSKBN29Q01N
[45]https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/se/date/2021-10-21/segment/01https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdfhttps://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biden-taiwan/taiwan-biden-ties-off-to-strong-start-with-invite-for-top-diplomat-idUSKBN29Q01Nhttps://thediplomat.com/2021/04/us-ambassador-makes-first-visit-to-taiwan-in-more-than-40-years/
[46] https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/1173/text?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22%5C%22taiwan+invasion+prevention+act%5C%22%22%2C%22%5C%22taiwan%22%2C%22invasion%22%2C%22prevention%22%2C%22act%5C%22%22%5D%7D&r=1&s=2