Providence
November 3, 2026
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and his staff recently broke a globe used by Gen. Dwight Eisenhower during World War II. As the Washington Post reports, “Ordinarily, moving historical items within the building is a deliberate process overseen by trained curators.” But Hegseth’s staff knew better and sent its own crew to move the globe into his workspace. “They lost control of the artifact and dropped it, sending the globe crashing onto its base…The resulting gash appears to be several inches wide.” One Pentagon source blames the Hegseth team’s “lack of patience.”
Could there be a more fitting metaphor for the Trump administration’s sledgehammer blows to the international system America built?
A LEGACY OF DOPES
President Donald Trump has never been a cheerleader for the postwar international system. His contempt for it—and its defenders—was put on display six months into his first term, when his own Pentagon and State Department officials tried to explain for him that “The post-war international rules-based order is the greatest gift of the greatest generation,” as Defense Secretary James Mattis said during the now-infamous briefing. Trump’s response to the insights offered by Mattis, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Secretary of Treasury Steven Mnuchin and Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Joseph Dunford: “You’re a bunch of dopes and babies.”
What some call the “liberal international order,” others the “rules-based order” may seem esoteric, but these are just descriptions of how America and its allies have tried to make the world work in the decades since World War II: They developed rules and norms of behavior; encouraged democratic governance; promoted liberal (open, freedom-oriented) political and economic institutions; and called upon governments to promote good order within and across their borders.
The process of building this liberal international order began in 1941, when President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill unveiled the Atlantic Charter. The Charter’s ideas represented what FDR called “the foundation for an international accord that would bring order and security after the chaos of the war.” Nor was the effort wholly novel. It was essentially an attempt to update and expand the post-Napoleonic Pax Brittanica that made the 19th century one of the longest stretches of great-power peace in European history.
Adopting a policy that (in the words of NSC-68) committed America “to bring about order and justice by means consistent with the principles of freedom and democracy,” President Harry Truman forged NATO, rescued South Korea and West Berlin, signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, promoted GATT and fielded a peacetime military to buttress the postwar order.
Eisenhower took the baton from Truman and kept building the liberal order. Since “there will always be differences of interest,” he observed, “there must be some source of international order.” Importantly, he viewed America’s “collective-defense arrangements” as “the best and most effective means of preserving world order.”
President John Kennedy explained that “the American conception of world order” was premised on liberal principles such as “diversity,” “progress,” and “a free and diverse world.”
President Ronald Reagan committed America to defend “a peaceful, prosperous and humane international order.” Toward that end, he redoubled investment in deterrent strength, wielded U.S. might to enforce international law on the high seas, used the bully pulpit and economic big stick to promote human rights, and championed free trade.
These leaders recognized that if the liberal international order were to collapse, hostile regimes would replace it with something less liberal, less orderly and more costly to America. They also recognized that the liberal international order—perhaps because it sounds so esoteric, so academic—needed to be explained and clarified for the American people.
HOW LIBERAL ORDER HELPS AMERICA
Trump and Hegseth don’t defend the liberal international order. That’s regrettable, but the reason they don’t is indefensible: They don’t understand the benefits—especially for America—of the liberal international order.
In the 76 years before World War II, America’s per-capita GDP increased by 136 percent. In the 76 years between the end of World War II and 2021, America’s per-capita GDP increased by 320 percent. This expansion in economic prosperity didn’t happen magically, organically or accidentally. It was the byproduct of the institutions and systems of the liberal international order—and especially the security represented by the United States.
The “myth is that our allies are making us poor by free-riding on our military expenditures,” as the late Gen. William Odom, former director of the National Security Agency, observed. “How are we to explain that the United States has gotten richer than its allies? Proponents of this argument cannot explain why. They fail to realize that our military alliances, by lowering transaction costs, have facilitated the vast increases in international trade from which the United States profits enormously.”
If those benefits aren’t direct enough for critics of the liberal international order, consider its impact on human life. One study finds that war killed an average of 1-2 percent of the human population from 1600 to 1945. Among that number were more than 521,000 U.S. troops—killed in just 63 months of fighting during the world wars. However, after America began erecting and buttressing a liberal international order, there was a dramatic drop in lives lost due to war: fewer than 100,000 U.S. battle deaths—and an average of just 0.4 percent of the global population—during the Cold War’s entire 45-year span.
Less war means less military spending. During World War I, America diverted a per-year average of 16 percent of GDP to defense. During World War II, it poured an annual average of 27 percent of GDP into defense. During the Cold War, as we accepted the responsibility of global leadership, Americans invested an average of 7 percent of GDP on defense. Those investments didn’t end all wars, of course, but they did prevent World War III. (Americans spend less than half the Cold War percentage on defense today. Hopefully, we haven’t forgotten that deterring war is far less expensive than waging war.)
In short, the liberal international order has been good for the world—and America. FDR and Churchill, Truman and Ike, Kennedy and Reagan, Mattis and Tillerson weren’t “dopes” for envisioning, building, sustaining or defending it.
FOUNDATIONS
If Trump is contemptuous of the liberal order, one gets the sense that the advisors who have replaced his first-term “dopes” look upon the chaos spread by China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, the Houthis, and by Trump himself, and conclude that there’s no such thing as international order—that foreign policy is just a never-ending exercise in crisis management.
Let’s stipulate that the best we can do is manage crises as they emerge. How, exactly, do we do that without some baseline idea of what we want the world to look like after crises are resolved? And isn’t that baseline idea—that endpoint—another name for a kind of order?
The situation around the Strait of Hormuz is a perfect example: Under the liberal international order, the waterway was open, trade flowed, commerce flourished, people were fed, industries were powered. After war broke out, Iran challenged that order by closing the strait, in violation of international law that guarantees the universal right of passage through the strait. The U.S. military is answering that challenge. The Trump administration is trying to return the strait to the status quo ante—a status quo premised on open commerce, the free flow of goods, norms of behavior, responsible governance.
In short, the Trump administration unwittingly embraces the foundations of liberal order not because they’re perfect, cost-free or easy to enforce, but because they work, serve U.S. interests and are better than the alternatives.
As the Providence statement on faith and foreign policy observes, “There is no perfect human political system, but we believe the liberal order is the least flawed of all presently available options and constitutes the best means for accomplishing the ends for which government was ordained.” Because of their resources and reach, America and its allies have “special stewardship responsibilities…to encourage, grow and defend the institutions and culture of ordered liberty among the community of responsible sovereign nations.”
RE-FORMATIONS
The bad news is that if America doesn’t do its part to sustain—and reform—the existing order, countries like China and Russia will continue to deform it. The good news is that there are ways to reform—more accurately, “re-form”—the order America began building after World War II.
First, America’s free world allies are stepping up and helping out.European nations have sent more aid to Ukraine than has the U.S. France and Britain will lead the postwar peacekeeping mission in Ukraine. Germany has launched a massive rearmament program. Poland is spending nearly 5 percent of GDP on defense. EU states are investing $894 billion to rearm. NATO’s European members plus Canada have increased defense spending 20 percent the past two years alone.
Japan is building toward the world’s third-largest defense budget, constructing warships for regional partners, lining its territories with missiles to deter PRC attacks, and engaging in all-domain combat training with U.S. forces. Australia has poured weapons into Ukraine; trained 30,000 Ukrainian troops; is investing aggressively in submarine warfare; and is building a regional repair hub for F-35s. South Korea has delivered 155mm shells to Ukraine via the U.S.; defensive systems to the Philippines; rocket-artillery and tanks to Poland; artillery systems to the U.S; air-defense systems to the UAE. Israel conducted 40 percent of the sorties targeting Iran this year.
Second, thought leaders at home and political leaders abroad are developing proposals that rethink international organizations—and forge new ones—to bless action and bypass inertia. Former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has stood up the Alliance of Democracies Foundation, which provides the intellectual framework for an “alliance for peace, prosperity and the advancement of democracy.” Larger than NATO, smaller than the UN, dedicated to what FDR called “armed defense of democratic existence,” an Alliance of Democracies could play a role where NATO won’t (due to geographic limits) and the UN can’t (due to autocratic roadblocks). Such a body wouldn’t be a panacea for the world’s ills. But unlike the UN, it could defend the frontlines of freedom, harmonize the free world’s efforts and promote the free world’s interests.
Third, the term “rules-based liberal international order” is more than a mouthful. It causes people’s eyes to glaze over. Words matter when trying to build public support; clarity matters. For the better part of a decade, Amb. Daniel Fried, among others, has promoted an alternative term that captures the same idea but resonates far better with the American people: “free world order.” After all, the term “free world” was coined by FDR and used by American presidents for some 80 years to rally the American people, unite our allies and define our enemies.
The “free world order” is something the American people can relate to, fight for and invest in, but we need leaders who will use the phrase, explain it and believe in it.
We don’t have such leaders right now. Instead, as Hegseth’s handling of Ike’s globe illustrates, we have leaders who are impatient and clumsy; who would rather mock than learn from the wisdom of others; who want the trappings of greatness without doing the work to earn it; who think they can remake the world without investing the care or time or energy (at home or abroad) needed to bring about such lofty aims.