A Blueprint for Deterring War over Taiwan

Global Security Review, 3.23.26

Two especially interested parties have watched Operation Epic Fury (OEF) from a distance. China has taken notes. And INDOPACOM has kept track of the munitions consumed by CENTCOM. Both the PRC and INDOPACOM know that what’s happening above, in and around Tehran will impact Beijing’s plans to take Taiwan—and Washington’s plans to prevent that.

Force
PRC strongman Xi Jinping declares Taiwan “must and will be” absorbed. He has even set a deadline for his military to be ready to seize Taiwan: 2027.

The Pentagon reports that Beijing “continues to refine multiple military options” to take Taiwan “by brute force.” Xi is assembling the capabilities to execute those options: 420,000 troops, 750 fighter-jets, 300 bombers, 158 warships (including 50 landing ships) and hundreds of missile systems—all in the Taiwan Strait region.

In response, Taiwan has increased defense spending from 2% of GDP in 2019 to 3.3% of GDP in 2026, with plans to invest 5% of GDP on defense by 2030.

Taiwan is using those resources to produce homegrown antiship, air-defense, land-attack and air-to-air missiles; expand production of attack-drones; and build a fleet of submarines. Taiwan recently received ATACMS missiles and HIMARS systems. Taipei is still awaiting delivery of dozens of F-16V fighters and TOW antitank systems (part of a $21-billion backlog of U.S. arms). Taipei also wants F-35s and additional Patriot systems.

In short, Taiwan is racing to construct “a porcupine defense”—one that would make an invasion so painful as to dissuade Xi from even attempting it.

U.S.
While Xi has been clear about his plans for Taiwan, Washington has been vague. Under the Taiwan Relations Act, neither side of the Taiwan Strait knows exactly what Washington would do in the event of war.

It’s time to shift from that policy of “strategic ambiguity” to one of strategic clarity. There’s risk in this. But the secret alliances that led to World War I remind us there’s greater risk in leaving defense guarantees opaque. And the open defense treaties that followed World War II—and prevented World War III—remind us the prudent course is clarity of commitment.

INDOPACOM commander Adm. Samuel Paparo is doing his part to send a clear message. If Beijing attacks Taiwan, he plans to “turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape.”

The drones and missilery of “hellscape” would come from multiple directions.

In 2024, the U.S. Army moved Typhon missile systems to the Philippines. In 2025 the Pentagon created Task Force-Philippines and deployed a Marine unit armed with anti-ship systems to the Philippines. In 2026, the Pentagon unveiled Army Rotational Force-Philippines, which will likely deploy missile and drone assets.

The Pentagon is revitalizing airfields in the Philippines, Tinian and Wake Island; basing top-of-the-line fighters on Okinawa; and rotating B-52s through Australia.

Army units on Palau have tested land-based missiles against seagoing targets. And F-35s are now carrying long-range antiship missiles—tailormade for targeting a PRC invasion fleet.

The U.S. Navy’s prowess has been on full display in OEF—eliminating Iran’s fleet, launching TLAMs, generating hundreds of strike sorties, shielding assets ashore and at sea. But what’s needed vis-à-vis China is deterrent naval power. Tactical deterrence of this sort is about presence—having tangible military capabilities in a given theater to deter aggression. Warships are very effective at this. But with just 292 ships, America’s Navy lacks the assets to be present in all the places it’s needed.

Allies
That’s why allies are critical.

China’s capabilities are daunting. But China has no real allies. Conversely, America’s not-so-secret weapon is its interconnected system of alliances. America’s alliances serve as force-multipliers, layers of strategic depth, and outer rings of America’s own security—enabling power projection through prepositioning, basing, overflight and resupply. 

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi describes an attack on Taiwan as a “threat to Japan’s survival,” indicating Japan would assist the U.S. in defending the island.

In hopes of preventing such a scenario, Japan has bolstered defenses across its southwestern territories: F-35Bs on Kyushu; anti-ship, air-defense and electronic-warfare units on islands south of Kyushu; air-defense and missile-defense units on Yonaguni Island (70 miles east of Taiwan). In addition, Japan is fielding 22 attack submarines, acquiring 500 TLAMs, producing missiles domestically, and upconverting ships into aircraft carriers armed with F-35Bs.  

Australia is partnering with the U.S. and Britain to deploy a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, and Australia has opened its territory to U.S. Marines, submarines and B-52s.

Both Japan and Australia have conducted freedom-of-navigation operations through the Taiwan Strait, as have Britain, Canada, France and Germany. Britain, Italy and France are coordinating deployments of their aircraft carriers in the Pacific.

When China cut off supply of a key element needed for TLAM production, Raytheon turned to Briain and France. Norway is supplying the U.S. with antiship missiles and joint strike missiles. A U.S.-Israeli partnership is manufacturing loitering munitions, which are likely part of Paparo’s “hellscape.”

Deter
Near the end of his tenure commanding U.S. Army-Pacific, Gen. Robert Brown reported that his PRC counterparts “don’t fear us anymore.”

This is regrettable but understandable. America’s Navy deploys fewer than 300 ships—which, like America’s commitments, are spread around the world. Those commitments expend finite assets: OEF has exposed the limitations of U.S. weapons stockpiles and production capacity, and it has forced the Pentagon to shuffle assets from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East.

China’s commitments and assets, conversely, are focused on its neighborhood. If Xi moves against Taiwan, his arsenal will be better stocked than the U.S. military’s—and more sophisticated than Iran’s.
 
Deterring Xi from making that move will require more capability and more defense spending.

Sen. Roger Wicker has unveiled a plan to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP. Similarly, the Commission on National Defense Strategy recommends lifting defense spending to levels “commensurate with the U.S. national effort seen during the Cold War.”

Although the president recently called for more military spending, the administration’s FY2026 defense budget was just 3.2% of GDP. The Cold War average was more than twice that.

Trial
There’s a blueprint here for deterring war over Taiwan: Washington needs to be clear about the nature of its commitment to Taiwan. Washington needs to view alliances not as liabilities to cut, but as resources to nurture. And Washington needs to expand deterrent capabilities.

“We cannot afford,” as Churchill counseled, “to work on narrow margins, offering temptations to a trial of strength.”